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Survival of the Federal Common Law D'Oench Doctrine?
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret banking agreements, agreements between a financial in-
stitution and its customer that are not contained in the financial
institution's documentation, pose a danger to government regulatory
agencies during a financial institution's insolvency. These agree-
ments are not as clandestine as the name implies. While some secret
agreements are conscious efforts to defraud regulators, many are
very innocent in nature. Secret bank agreements may be as simple as
additional assurances made by the bank that are not contained in the
bank records or oral modifications of loan terms or conditions. De-
spite this seeming simplicity, they can be important in the event of a
bank insolvency because the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) must act quickly to preserve the going concern of the bank
and to protect depositors. Due to this need for expedience, the FDIC
must be able to rely on the written records of the bank to plan its
course of action. Any agreement not contained in the bank records
impairs the ability of the FDIC to rely on these written records.
In 1942, the Supreme Court developed a federal common law
doctrine to protect the FDIC from secret banking agreements in
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC.1 This common law doctrine be-
came known as the D'Oench doctrine, and it extended protection
against secret agreements to the FDIC when handling the assets of an
insolvent financial institution. The doctrine prohibited parties from
raising defenses against the FDIC that were based on unwritten
agreements when the FDIC brought suit to collect on the assets of an
insolvent financial institution. Thus, any agreement between a finan-
cial institution and its customer would be interpreted according to the
written terms contained in the bank records when the related asset
was acquired by the FDIC during insolvency. Reference to the un-
written portion of the agreement was strictly barred. Over time,
courts have expanded the protection afforded by the original doctrine
and have applied the same protection to other regulatory agencies.2
1. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
2. For a discussion of the expansion of the D'Oench doctrine, see infra notes 44-45
and accompanying text.
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Eight years after D'Oench, Congress partially codified the com-
mon law in section 2(13)(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act,3
which required agreements between a financial institution and its
borrower to be in writing. During the next thirty-nine years, the
common law D'Oench doctrine and its statutory counterpart were
used in conjunction to provide protection against secret agreements
for the FDIC.4 During this period, despite the expansion of the
common law D'Oench doctrine to provide greater protection to the
FDIC and other agencies, the statute codifying D'Oench remained
true to the limited facts of the original case and underwent no signifi-
cant changes until 1989. Congress, spurred by the crisis in the
banking and thrift industry, enacted the Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (the FIRREA) in 1989.5 The
FIRREA codified many of the significant developments in the com-
mon law D'Oench doctrine and extended the protection to, among
others, the newly created Resolution Trust Corporation (the RTC).6
While the FIRREA expanded statutory protection, the federal
common law D'Oench doctrine itself is even broader than the FIR-
REA in its protection of federal regulatory agencies. For example,
unlike the protection afforded by FIRREA, the protection of the
D'Oench doctrine is not limited to claims that would defeat the
FDIC's interest in a specific asset.7 The D'Oench doctrine also pro-
vides protection against claims sounding in tort.8 Thus, the blanket of
protection afforded to federal regulators by the combined protection
of the common law and the statutes would be jeopardized if the fed-
eral common law D'Oench doctrine were abolished, leaving only the
FIRREA for protection.
3. Pub. L. No. 81-797, ch. 967, § 2(13)(e), 64 Stat. 888 (1950) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e)(1) (1994)).
4. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
5. See Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183.
6. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 83 F.3d 1317, 1326-27
(11th Cir. 1996).
7. See Brookside Assocs. v. Rifkin, 49 F.3d 490, 495 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
D'Oench doctrine is not limited to a specific asset); RTC v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587,
594-95 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that, regardless of whether a specific asset is
involved, the D'Oench doctrine applies to claims or defenses that relate to ordinary
banking transactions); Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1995)
(rejecting specific asset requirement for the D'Oench doctrine); Jackson v. FDIC, 981
F.2d 730, 734-35 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that claims that do not diminish or defeat the
FDIC's interest in a specific asset are still barred by the D'Oench doctrine).
8. See In re Geri Zahn, 25 F.3d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994); see also OPS Shopping
Ctr., Inc. v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 306,310 (11th Cir. 1993).
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In 1994, the Supreme Court cast some doubt on the future of the
D'Oench doctrine in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC.9 In O'Melveny,
the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver for a failed savings and loan, pe-
titioned the Court to create new federal common law that would
preempt a state statute disallowing a cause of action for negligence
and a breach of fiduciary duty suit against the law firm of the failed
savings and loan.l° The Supreme Court refused to create new com-
mon law favoring the FDIC; instead, the Court characterized the
FIRREA as a specific grant of powers to the FDIC and cited specific
provisions of the FIRREA, including the D'Oench statutory counter-
part, concluding 'inclusio unius, exclusio alterius""-the inclusion of
one, the exclusion of another. 2
In recent decisions, both the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) 3 and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Eighth Circuit) 4 in-
terpreted the Supreme Court's holding in O'Melveny" as a
declaration that the common law D'Oench doctrine was preempted
by the FIRREA. It is against this backdrop that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Eleventh Circuit), in
Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank N.A.,' 6 held that the
common law D'Oench doctrine had not been preempted and still
provided protection to the FDIC.
While the decision of the Eleventh Circuit was a sound and well
reasoned one, it was not accepted by the Supreme Court. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in the Motorcity case.' 7 The Court
9. 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
10. See id. at 82-83.
11. Id. at 86.
12. See id. at 85-86. The conclusions drawn from this by the D.C. Circuit and the
Eighth Circuit are that the grant of powers under the statute is exclusive. Because the
D'Oench doctrine was not specifically included, it is excluded; therefore, it was not avail-
able to the FDIC.
13. See Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
14. See DiVall Insured Income Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank,
69 F.3d 1398 (8th Cir. 1995).
15. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79,85-86 (1994).
16. 83 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997). For a discussion of
the Supreme Court's instructions in their decision to vacate the judgment and remand the
case, see infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text. In vacating Motorcity, the Supreme
Court did not discuss the D'Oench doctrine and its application in Motorcity, thus, the
discussion of the D'Oench doctrine and the analysis set forth in this Note remain perti-
nent, if not essential, to the law surrounding secret banking agreements. For further
discussion, see notes 236-73 and accompanying text.
17. See Hess v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997).
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vacated the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case
for further consideration 8 in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Atherton v. FDIC."9 The Supreme Court's holding in Atherton is
similar to its holding in O'Melveny, but Atherton has a more direct
impact on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Motorcity. In Atherton,
the Supreme Court flatly rejected an existing federal common law
standard of corporate governance for the officers of a failed, federally
chartered financial institution.? In doing so, the Supreme Court held
that the corporate governance standard for the officers of a federally
chartered financial institution was to be determined by the federal
statute2' and augmented only by state law when the state law adopts a
standard higher than that of the federal statute."
The Motorcity case is distinguishable from Atherton on several
grounds, but these distinctions may not be sufficient to keep the fed-
eral common law D'Oench doctrine alive. Atherton and O'Melveny
may establish a trend of the Court. This trend suggests that the fed-
eral statute is the primary source of protection for the FDIC and that
the federal statute may be supplemented only by applicable state law.
This analysis leaves no room for the federal common law.
Today, it is unclear how this judicial trend will affect the federal
common law D'Oench doctrine. The Supreme Court appears to be
chipping away at the FIDC federal common law protections, sug-
gesting that the D'Oench doctrine is no longer valid. But, the
D'Oench doctrine is on much firmer ground than the federal com-
mon law doctrine proposed in O'Melveny and abandoned in
Atherton. For this reason, it is important to understand the history of
the D'Oench doctrine, up to and including the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion in Motorcity. Only then can the future of the federal com-
mon law D'Oench doctrine be properly evaluated and can judgment
be passed on the logic and wisdom of the Supreme Court's policy of
removing the FDIC's federal common law protection.
This Comment first traces the origins of the federal common law
D'Oench doctrine, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, and
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989.'3 Next this Comment reviews the Supreme Court's decision in
O'Melveny and the decisions of the two circuits interpreting
18. See id.
19. 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997).
20. See Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666,670 (1997).
21. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994).
22. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 667.
23. See infra notes 28-52 and accompanying text.
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O'Melveny.24 This Comment then describes the Motorcity decision
with a focus on the Eleventh Circuit's discussion of O'Melveny and
D'Oench.2 Then, this Comment analyzes the Eleventh Circuit's deci-
sion in comparison to Murphy and DiVall and the interpretation of
O'Melveny.26 Finally, this Comment examines the Supreme Court's
opinion in Atherton and analyzes its potential effect on Motorcity and
the federal common law D'Oench doctrine.2
II. BACKGROUND LAW
A. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC
In D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, the Supreme Court es-
tablished a federal common law doctrine to protect the FDIC from
secret banking agreements when the FDIC collected on the assets of
an insolvent financial institution.' D'Oench involved a note acquired
by the FDIC following the insolvency of Belleville Bank & Trust
Co. 29 The petitioner in the case, a securities dealer, sold bonds to the
bank.' When the bonds became worthless, the petitioner signed a
demand note in favor of the bank which was to be carried on the
bank's books in place of the worthless bonds." The note was exe-
cuted on the understanding that it would not be called for payment.'
When the bank later became insolvent, the FDIC stepped in and ac-
quired the assets of the bank.33 The FDIC sought payment of the
note from petitioner, who defended on the basis of his oral agree-
ment with the bank?3 The Court's analysis centered on the applicable
law governing the note.35 There was confusion as to whether the note
was executed in Missouri or Illinois, and as to which state's law would
govern.36 Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to apply the law of
either state and held that federal common law would control.37
24. See infra notes 53-115 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 116-206 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 207-30 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 231-73 and accompanying text.
28. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
29. See id. at 454.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See hL
36. See iL
37. See id at 456.
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The Court based its decision on the Federal Reserve Act, which
revealed a federal policy "to protect the [FDIC], and the public funds
which it administers, against misrepresentations as to the securities or
other assets in the portfolios of the banks which the [FDIC] insures
or to which it makes loans."38 While the case was a clear attempt to
misrepresent the assets of the bank, the Court's holding was broader
and the emphasis was not on whether the maker of the note knew
that it will be used to defraud creditors and regulators, but that the
note would have that effect.39 Therefore, when the FDIC acquired an
asset from an insolvent financial institution, the obligor was pre-
cluded from defending his obligation on the basis of an oral
agreement, regardless of the obligor's motives.
B. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950
Eight years after the Supreme Court's decision in D'Oench,
Congress codified the court's holding in section 2(13)(e) of the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Act of 1950.o The statute bars the use of
agreements against the FDIC unless the agreements are in writing,
have been reviewed by bank officials, and are a part of the bank rec-
ords. This protection was required by the FDIC because, in cases of
insolvency, it has to operate quickly, basing decisions solely on the
bank records, in order to preserve the value of the failed bank and
prevent interruption of the bank services." The decisions based on
the bank records would be compromised if the records did not accu-
rately reflect the sum total of the bank assets and liabilities.
As originally fashioned, both the common law rule and its statu-
tory counterpart operated as a bar to defenses raised against the
FDIC in its corporate4' capacity, that is, only in its role as provider of
38. Id. at 457.
39. See id. at 460.
40. Pub. L. No. 81-797, ch. 967, § 2(13)(e), 64 Stat. 888. No agreement which tends to
diminish or defeat the right, title or interest of the Corporation in any asset acquired by it
under this section, either as security for a loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the
corporation unless such agreement-(1) shall be in writing, (2) shall have been executed
by the bank and the person or persons claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including
the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank, (3) shall
have been approved by the board of directors of the bank or its loan committee, which
approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or committee, and (4) shall have
been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the bank. 64 Stat.
888 (1980), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (prior to the 1989 amendment).
41. See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1987) (quoting Gunter v. Hutchinson,
674 F.2d 862,865 (11th Cir. 1982)).
42. When the FDIC takes over a failed financial institution, it operates in two capaci-
ties. In its receivership capacity, the FDIC steps in to sell the institution's assets to a
1997]
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deposit insurance and purchaser of unwanted assets." As time went
on and the need for additional protection increased, the D'Oench
doctrine was expanded to meet these needs. The doctrine has since
been expanded from its initial boundaries to extend protection to the
FDIC in both its corporate and receivership capacities, other regula-
tory agencies, and private third parties." The doctrine has also
expanded to preclude affirmative claims against federal regulatory
agencies, as well as defenses, if they arose out of secret agreements.
45
For many years the courts used both the statute and the expanding
common law doctrine to aid in the goal of protecting the FDIC
against claims and defenses of borrowers. 
4
C. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989
The peaceful coexistence between the statute and the common
law was shaken by the passage of the FIRREA in 1989.4' The act was
passed "to give the FDIC power to take all actions necessary to re-
solve the problems posed by a financial institution in default., 48 The
FIRREA codified many of the important developments of the com-
mon law D'Oench doctrine. The protection of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)
was extended to the FDIC as receiver,49 to the RTC in both corporate
and receiver capacities,-° and to bridge banks." One other significant
codification was found at 12 U.S.C § 1821(d)(9)(A), which extended
the protection of § 1823(e) to affirmative claims against the banking
solvent institution in return for the solvent institution's assumption of the failed institu-
tions deposit liabilities. The FDIC in its corporate capacity insures depositors and
purchases any unwanted assets from the FDIC in its receivership capacity and tries to
collect on these assets. See Gunter v. Hutchinson, 674 F.2d 862,865-66 (11th Cir. 1982).
43. See Vernon v. RTC, 907 F.2d 1101, 1105 (11th Cir. 1990).
44. See Newton v. Uniwest Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
(extending the D'Oench doctrine to a private bank as FSLIC's successor-in-interest in a
note); Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1528 (5th Cir. 1990) (extending the D'Oench
doctrine to FDIC's assignee, a bridge bank); FSLIC v. Two Rivers Assocs., 880 F.2d 1267,
1274, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the D'Oench doctrine protects both the
FSLIC and FDIC in both corporate and receiver capacities).
45. See Jones v. RTC, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995); RTC v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 595
(11th Cir. 1995) (en bane), cert denied sub nom; Timberland Design v. First Serv. Bank
for Say., 932 F.2d 46,50 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
46. See Villafane-Neriz v. FDIC, 20 F.3d 35,40 (1st Cir. 1994).
47. See Pub. L. No. 101-73, (103 Stat.) 183.
48. H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 330, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
126.
49. The language "or as receiver of any insured depository institution" was added to
the statute in 1989. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
50. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A) (1994).
51. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(4)(I) (1994).
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authority. The relevant portion of the statute says that: "any agree-
ment which does not meet the requirements set forth in section
1823(e) of this title shall not form the basis of, or substantially com-
prise, a claim against the receiver or the Corporation."
52
D. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC
The Supreme Court decision in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC3
has brought about the first significant post-FIRREA challenge to the
existence of the common law D'Oench doctrine. In O'Melveny, the
Supreme Court was faced with a suit brought by the FDIC, as re-
ceiver for a failed savings and loan, for legal malpractice and breach
of fiduciary duty against the former legal counsel of the savings and
loan.' The federal district court granted summary judgment to the
law firm on the ground that the FDIC, as receiver, stood in the shoes
of the failed savings and loan.' Therefore, knowledge of wrongdoing
by officers of the failed savings and loan was attributable to the
FDIC, and that precluded any suit against the law firm. 6 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that even
if the officer's inequitable conduct was attributable to the savings and
loan, it was not imputed to the FDIC so as to preclude its legal mal-
practice action. 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The central issue addressed by the Court was the matter of con-
trolling law. 9 The FDIC argued that federal common law, not
California law, should govern on the imputation of knowledge.' In
the alternative, even if California law governed the general question
of imputed knowledge, the FDIC posited that federal common law
should control the narrower question of whether such knowledge will
be imputed to the FDIC as receiver of the failed savings and loan.6'
The Court soundly rejected the contention that federal common law
controlled the general subject of imputation and held that California
52. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A) (1994).
53. 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
54. See id at 82 The FDIC as receiver for the insolvent savings and loan called for
the savings and loan to refund certain investments in fraudulent real estate syndicates.
See id. Petitioner law firm represented the savings and loan in two of these real estate
syndicates. See id.
55. See id. at 82
56. See id.
57. See id
58. 510 U.S. 989 (1993).
59. See O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 83.
60. See id
61. See id
1997]
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law was controlling.62
A more delicate issue was the status of the existing federal com-
mon law and its application to the FDIC as receiver. In making its
decision, the Court looked to the underlying statutory scheme.63 Jus-
tice Scalia, writing for the court, stated "we of course would not
contradict an explicit federal statutory provision. Nor would we
adopt a court-made rule to supplement federal statutory regulation
that [was] comprehensive and detailed; matters left unaddressed in
such a scheme [were] presumably left subject to the disposition pro-
vided by state law."' The Court's understanding of the FIRREA, as
enunciated in O'Melveny, appeared to be that the language of the
statute indicates that the FDIC as receiver steps into the shoes of the
failed savings and loan. Therefore, under the Court's analysis, any
California tort claim defense that was valid against the savings and
loan by showing imputed knowledge was also valid against the FDIC
as receiver.'
To counter this, the FDIC asked the Court to read the statute67
as a non-exclusive grant of rights to the FDIC as receiver that can be
supplemented or modified by federal common law.' The FDIC pos-
ited that the FIRREA confirms the Court's authority to promulgate
such common law by demonstrating a high federal interest in the
area.69 The Court rejected this line of reasoning by characterizing
certain provisions of the FIRREA as "specifically creat[ed] special
federal rules of decision regarding claims by, and defenses against,
the FDIC as receiver."'7 The Court then listed several provisions of
the act, including the D'Oench counterpart,7 to illustrate the specific
grants of power in the act.' Justice Scalia then wrote, "Inclusio
unius, exclusio alterius.... To create additional 'federal common-
law' exceptions is not to 'supplement' this scheme, but to alter it."'73
This case was determined to be one in which a special federal rule
62. See id. at 84-85.
63. See id. at 85-86.
64. IL; see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 319 (1981); Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981).
65. See O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 86.
66. See Id.
67. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
68. See O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 86.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9) (1994).
72. See O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 86.
73. Id. at 86-87
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was not justified.74
The application of a special federal rule was limited to situations
in which there was a "significant conflict between some federal policy
or interest and the use of state law." 5 The FDIC failed to identify a
federal policy or interest that was in jeopardy.6 To apply a federal
common law rule in this case would facilitate the FDIC's nationwide
litigation, "but if the avoidance of those ordinary consequences quali-
fied as an identifiable federal interest, [the Court] would be awash in
'federal common-law' rules."' The FDIC's only response was that
failure to apply federal common law protection would act to deplete
the deposit insurance fund. 8 To this, Justice Scalia replied that
"there is no federal policy that the [FDIC] should always win."79
The actual holding in O'Melveny does not claim an outright pre-
emption of an existing common law doctrine, but only declares the
court's unwillingness to establish a new federal common law rule.
The closest the Court comes to the preemption issue with regard to
existing common law is its discussion of the exclusivity of the grant of
powers in the FIRREA and the characterization of the FIRREA as a
comprehensive statutory scheme.8 Nonetheless, this decision has
been the basis for two circuit court decisions in which the circuits
concluded that the federal common law D'Oench doctrine is dead.8'
E. Murphy v. FDIC
The first post-O'Melveny decision to address this issue was Mur-
phy v. FDIC.' The petitioner in Murphy was a disgruntled investor
in a real estate limited partnership.' Southeast Bank acted as the
primary lender for the partnership and was involved in the partner-
ship's public bond offering.' The partnership's financing plans fell
through, resulting in a default on its loans to Southeast Bank, which
subsequently foreclosed on the property.? Soon thereafter, South-
74. See Id. at 87.
75. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).
76. See O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 88.
77. Id.; see also United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341,347, n.13 (1966).
78. See O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 88.
79. Id.
80. See Id. at 85-86
81. See DiVall, 69 F.3d 1398 (8th Cir. 1995); Murphy, 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
82. 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
83. See i& at 35.
84. See id.
85. See id.
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east Bank was declared insolvent and the FDIC was appointed as re-
ceiver.' The petitioner filed suit following the FDIC's appointment
as receiver.' The district court granted the FDIC's motion for sum-
mary judgment and the partnership appealed.' The district court
held that the D'Oench doctrine and the federal statute89 controlled
because the plain language of the agreement with the bank plainly
stated that the "[lender is a lender only and shall not be considered a
shareholder, joint venturer or partner of the [b]orrower. '
The petitioner reasserted his claims on appeal to the D.C. Cir-
cuit. Petitioner claimed that Southeast Bank controlled the
partnership and thus assumed the role of a joint venturer or partner."
From this relationship stemmed a list of allegations' related to
wrongful acts of the partnership's management. 3 To support this po-
sition, the petitioner raised issues concerning the applicability of the
D'Oench doctrine and its statutory counterpart.9 The first issue was
that the statute95 should not apply to the substantive claims. The
court concluded:
By their terms, the statutory provisions bar any claim that
(1) [was] based upon an agreement that [was] either (a) un-
written or (b) if in writing, [did] not meet the stringent
requirements of [the statute], and (2) would diminish or de-
feat the interest of the FDIC in an asset acquired by it in its
86. See id.
87. See ihL
88. See id at 34.
89. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1994).
90. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 36.
91. See id. at 35.
92. The petitioner brought nine counts in all, seven of which were related to the part-
nership. See id. at 35-36. Count three was for failure to register securities. See id. at 35.
Count four was for the unlawful offer and sale of securities. See id. Count five was for
breach of fiduciary duty. See id. Count six was for breach of contract. See id. Count
seven was for accounting improprieties. See id. Count eight was for fraud. See id. at 36.
Count nine was for negligent misrepresentations. See id.
Counts one and two were directed at the FDIC's alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) process. See id. In count one, Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment that the
FDIC is required to establish ADR and apply it to his case. See id. at 40. In count two,
the petitioner sought a Writ of Mandamus compelling count one. See id. Counts one and
two will not be discussed in the text. It should be noted that at the time of the appeal, the
FDIC had established ADR, so the declaratory judgment was rendered moot. See id. In
addition, the FDIC has full discretion as to who may use ADR. See id. at 40-41.
93. See id. at 35.
94. See id- at 36.
95. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1994).
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capacity as receiver of a failed depository institution."'
The court agreed with the Petitioner that even though Peti-
tioner's claims against the bank were based on an unwritten
agreement, the claims did not meet the specific asset requirement of
the statute, and therefore, were not barred by the statute.97
Having conquered the statutory hurdle, the petitioner followed
with the argument that the D'Oench doctrine was not applicable be-
cause it had been preempted by the Supreme Court in O'Melveny &
Myers v. FDIC." In defense of D'Oench, the FDIC argued that the
validity of the doctrine was not directly before the Supreme Court in
O'Melveny.9 This argument was rejected by the court, in favor of a
more general reading of the Supreme Court's decision.' The court
also rejected the FDIC's attempt to draw support from cases decided
prior to the O'Melveny decision and to distinguish O'Melveny as a
prohibition on the creation of new federal common law.' In its final
analysis, the court necessarily held that the D'Oench doctrine had
been preempted by the FIRREA. 2
F. DiValU Insured Income Fund Limited Partnership v. Boatmen's
First National Bank of Kansas City
The second post-O'Melveny court to decide the issue of preemp-
tion was the Eighth Circuit in DiVall Insured Income Fund Limited
Partnership v. Boatmen's First National Bank. 3 The dispute in Di-
Vail involved the validity of a promissory note acquired by
Boatmen's from the FDIC under a purchase and assumption agree-
ment.' DiVall, obligor under the note, filed a declaratory judgment
action claiming that it was not liable under the note for lack of con-
sideration."5 Boatmen's argued that the defense raised by DiVall was
barred because Boatmen's was a holder in due course and the de-
fense was barred by the D'Oench doctrine and its statutory
96. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 36.
97. See id. at 37.
98. 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
99. See Murphy, 61 F.3d. at 39.
100. See id. (relying on Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410,425 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
101. See id. at 39-40.
102. See id. at 40.
103. 69 F.3d 1398.
104. See Id. at 1399.
105. See Id. The basis for this claim was that the proceeds from the loan were not
disbursed to the partnership account, per the loan agreement, but to a different account
where they were taken by the general partners for other uses. See id.
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counterpart." 6 The federal holder in due course doctrine bars the
maker of a promissory note from asserting personal defenses against
the FDIC and its successors even though the defense was based on a
written agreement."° The district court granted summary judgment
for Boatmen's, holding that the defense was not barred by state
holder in due course law, but was barred under the federal common
law holder in due course doctrine."l The district court also held that
the D'Oench doctrine and its statutory counterpart were inapplicable,
as the case was based on a written agreement."l
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, DiVall argued that the state
holder in due course law should control."' The court of appeals ex-
amined the federal common law holder in due course and D'Oench
doctrines.' In reaching its holding, the court relied on the Supreme
Court's recent decision in O'Melveny, which characterized the FIR-
REA as a comprehensive regulatory scheme and specifically created
federal rules governing claims by and defenses against the FDIC."2
The court held that the federal holder in due course and the D'Oench
doctrines were preempted by the FIRREA.13 The court went on to
hold that because no specific provisions of the FIRREA applied,
state holder in due course law would control."4 The case was re-
manded to the district court for further proceedings. 1 5
II. MOTORCITY OF JACKSONVILLE, LTD. V. SOUTHEAST BANK,
N.A.: STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Eleventh Circuit was the third circuit after O'Melveny to
address the issue of preemption of the D'Oench doctrine. In its deci-
sion, the Eleventh Circuit refused to follow the holding of the D.C.
and Eighth Circuits. Instead, the court reached a different conclusion
regarding the interpretation of O'Melveny and the continued viability
106. See id. at 1400.
107. See id. at 1401.
108. See id. at 1400.
109. See id.
110. Seeid. at 1399.
111. See id. at 1400-01.
112. See O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 85-86.
113. See DiVall, 69 F.3d at 1402.
114. See id. at 1404.
115. See id. The Eighth Circuit instructed the district court to apply state holder in
due course law. See id. at 1404. Under State law, the note was non-negotiable due to its
variable interest rate terms. See id. at 1403. The note was executed prior to the inclusion
of variable rate instruments in the statutory definition of negotiable notes. See id. Thus,
Boatmen's was not a holder in due course and DiVall's defense was valid. See id.
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of the D'Oench doctrine.
A. Facts
The Motorcity case stemmed from a financing arrangement be-
tween Motorcity"6 and Southeast Bank, N.A. (Southeast Bank)."7
Motorcity, which was forming an automobile dealership, entered
into a floor plan financing agreement with Southeast Bank to finance
its vehicle purchases."' Under this agreement, the proceeds of sale of
each vehicle sold by Motorcity were to be used to repay the loan
designated for that vehicle."9 Motorcity informed Southeast Bank
that the investors were inexperienced in the business of selling used
vehicles and planned to operate the venture as absentee owners.""
Motorcity expressed particular concerns regarding out-of-trust sales,
in which the sales proceeds were not used to repay the loan desig-
nated for that particular vehicle.'2' Southeast Bank orally assured
Motorcity that it was experienced in this type of financing arrange-
ment and that it would watch for out-of-trust sales."
In June 1987, a written floor plan financing agreement was exe-
cuted."l Included in the terms of the written agreement was a
provision granting Southeast Bank the right to periodically audit Mo-
torcity's records. 4 Southeast Bank hired an independent auditor to
conduct the periodic audits.'" In the course of these audits, a pattern
of out-of-trust sales was discovered. 6 Southeast Bank failed to no-
tify Motorcity's investors of these out-of-trust sales despite its oral
assurances that it would do so.'27 In February 1989, Motorcity, during
a change in managers, discovered out-of-trust sales of more than
116. Motorcity is actually comprised of Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd., a limited part-
nership engaged in the business of selling used vehicles. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Inc., a
Florida corporation was the general partner for the Limited partnership. David S. Hess, a
Jacksonville physician, was the president and principal shareholder of Motorcity of Jack-
sonville, Inc. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 83 F.3d 1317,
1322 n.1. (1996).
117. See id. at 1321-22.
118. See id at 1322.
119. See icL
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See iL
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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$400,000.'" The discovery was promptly disclosed to Southeast Bank,
which called for immediate repayment of any and all out-of-trust
amounts.29 Because Motorcity was unable to meet its obligations to
Southeast Bank, the bank took possession of the dealership and a
$375,000 certificate of deposit.' 3 Motorcity repaid all of its loans to
Southeast Bank in April 1990.'
B. District Court
Motorcity filed an action against Southeast Bank in state court in
Florida alleging breach of a fiduciary duty, breach of an oral contract,
and negligence. 32 In September 1991, the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency declared Southeast Bank insolvent and appointed the FDIC as
receiver for the failed institution.'33 The FDIC was substituted as the
defendant in the state court action, and it removed the case to federal
court.34
Motorcity amended its complaint to state a claim only for breach
of a written contract.' 35 This amended complaint was dismissed by
the district court for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.'36 In dismissing the amended complaint, the court ruled
that the floor plan financing agreement gave Southeast Bank the
right to audit the records of Motorcity, but not the duty to do so.'
Therefore, Southeast Bank was under no contractual obligation to
inform Motorcity of any discovered out-of-trust sales.3 The district
court went on to hold that the D'Oench doctrine and the federal stat-
ute'39 required any agreement between a failed financial institution
and its customer to be in writing.'O Consequently, any claim for
breach of an oral contract was barred. 4' Finally, the court held that
Motorcity's putative tort claims were also barred by the D'Oench
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. The FDIC removed the case to federal court under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B).
See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1323 n.3.
135. See id. at 1322
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) (1994)
140. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1322.
141. See id.
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doctrine. 142
Motorcity moved for a rehearing and leave to amend its com-
plaint to include tort claims for negligence and breach of a fiduciary
duty to notify.143 The district court denied both motions and reiter-
ated that the D'Oench doctrine barred all oral contract claims,
including those recast as tort claims through artful pleading.'"
C. Eleventh Circuit
Motorcity appealed the decision of the district court. 4  The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Motorcity's state law
tort claims for negligence and breach of a fiduciary duty to notify
were free standing and therefore, not barred by the D'Oench doc-
trine.'46 The FDIC's petition for an en bane hearing was granted,
vacating the decision of the appellate court's panel. "7
Motorcity's sole basis for appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, was the district court's denial of its motion
to amend its complaint to add tort claims for negligence and breach
of fiduciary duty.'4  The denial of Motorcity's motion to amend by
the district court was based on the D'Oench doctrine. 149 The Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reviewed the
applicability of the D'Oench doctrine and the Federal statute'50 as a
bar to Motorcity's tort claims de novo."
142. See idL
143. See id. at 1323.
144. See id
145. See id
146. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 39 F.3d 292 (11th Cir.
1994).
147. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 58 F.3d 589 (11th Cir.
1995).
148. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 83 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th
Cir. 1996).
149. See id at 1323.
150. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1).
151. The standard of review of a district court's denial of a motion to amend a com-
plaint is that of abuse of discretion. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazelton Research, 401
U.S. 321,330 (1971); Shipper v. Eastern Air Lines, 868 F.2d 401,407 (11th Cir. 1989). In
other words, there must be a substantial reason for the district court to exercise its judg-
ment in the denial of a motion to amend. See Shipper, 868 F.2d at 407; see also Moore v.
Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1131 (1lth Cir. 1993) (holding that a justifying reason must be ap-
parent for the denial of the motion to amend). The futility of a claimant's proposed
amendment may be a justifiable reason for denying leave to amend. See Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Moore, 989 F.2d at 1131. As a general rule, when the basis for
the district court's denial of the motion to amend is futility of the amendment, the review
of the decision is de novo. See Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. State of Florida, 11
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Motorcity presented four arguments in its attempt to prevent the
D'Oench doctrine from acting as a bar to its claims against the
FDIC112 First, the federal common law D'Oench doctrine was statu-
torily preempted, thus leaving the FDIC to rely only on the statutory
counterparts.53 Second, Motorcity argued that the statutory counter-
parts of the D'Oench doctrine should act as a bar only to claims that
impair the FDIC's interest in a specific asset." Therefore, because
Motorcity repaid its loan prior to the FDIC's appointment as re-
ceiver, Motorcity argues that the statutory provisions would not
apply. 55 Third, Motorcity argued that its tort claims were free
standing and should not be barred even if the D'Oench doctrine were
given effect.'56 Finally, notwithstanding the D'Oench doctrine's pro-
hibition on reliance on oral agreements or representations,
Motorcity's state law tort claims for negligence and breach of fiduci-
ary duty were still viable." The court addressed each of Motorcity's
arguments in turn.
In support of its claim that the D'Oench doctrine had been pre-
empted by statute, Motorcity relied upon recent decisions of the D.
C. Circuit in Murphy v. FDIC'58 and the Eighth Circuit in DiVall In-
sured Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First National Bank.'59
Both of these decisions, in turn, based their holdings on the Supreme
Court decision in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC," which they inter-
preted as preempting the D'Oench common law doctrine. 6' The
Motorcity court, sitting en banc, disagreed with the analysis of the D.
C. Circuit and Eighth Circuit and held that the D'Oench doctrine had
not been preempted.'62
The court began with an analysis of federal common law begin-
ning with Swift v. Tyson." Following Swift, federal common law
F.3d 1341, 1348 (11th Cir. 1993); see also In re Geri Zahn, Inc., 25 F.3d 1539, 1542 (11th
Cir. 1994) (holding that application of the D'Oench doctrine is a question of law subject to
de novo review).
152. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1327.
153. See id.
154. See iL
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also, Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1327.
159. 69 F.3d 1398 (8th Cir. 1995); see also, Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1327.
160. 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
161. See Murphy, 61 F.3d at 40; DiVall, 69 F.3d at 1402.
162. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1327.
163. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that in the absence of state statutory or consti-
tutional provisions, federal courts sitting in diversity should not apply state court common
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developed alongside state law for nearly one hundred years. In 1938,
the Supreme Court flatly rejected the federal common law regime in
the landmark decision Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.' But, Erie was
not the end of the federal common law issue.
The Supreme Court "has recognized the need and authority in
some limited areas to formulate what has come to be known as
'federal common law.' ,165 Federal common law has been necessary
to protect uniquely federal interests.' The Court described federal
common law as a means to "fill the interstices of federal legisla-
tion."'67 Thus, having recognized a need to establish federal common
law in areas of uniquely federal interest, the question remained as to
the standard for statutory preemption of that common law.
Congressional intent is the central focus for statutory preemp-
tion of federal common law.'" Because federal lawmaking power is
vested in Congress, the standard for federal common law preemption
is lower than the clear and manifest purpose required to preempt
state law. 69 But, as the Supreme Court noted in United States v.
Texas,70 "[s]tatutes which invade the common law... are to be read
with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and
familiar principles, except where a statutory purpose to the contrary
is evident....' This presumption was adopted by the Motorcity court.
In Murphy, the D.C. Circuit failed to acknowledge the presump-
tion of the retention of the federal common law. That court relied on
the language of the Supreme Court in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC"n
law, but fashion their own common law by consulting general principles of jurisprudence).
164. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
165. Texas Indus. v. Ratcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981).
166. See Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988); see also, United States
v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1979); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597
(1959); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
167. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727.
168. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 83 F.3d 1317, 1329
(11th Cir. 1996).
169. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,313-14, 16-17 (1981).
170. 507 U.S. 529 (1993). In Texas, the Court faced a question regarding the Debt
Collection Act of 1982. Prior to the act, the common law established that all parties, in-
cluding state and local governments, who owed a contractual debt to the federal
government were obligated to pay pre-judgment interest. The 1982 codification of the
common law expressly excluded state and local governments from the definition of par-
ties subject to the act. The Court looked beyond the language of the act and held that
retention of the common law pertaining to states was necessary to uphold the purpose of
the act, collection of government debt. See id.
171. ld. at 534 (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
172. 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
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and held that the D'Oench doctrine disappeared.'" The Motorcity
court, however, distinguished O'Melveny. In O'Melveny the Su-
preme Court was asked to create a new federal common law doctrine
in an area where Congress had not expressed any special concerns. 75
Motorcity involved the retention of existing federal common law. 6
In that respect, the Motorcity court felt that the Supreme Court's de-
cision in United States v. Texas provided better guidance than the
decision in O'Melveny."w
Motorcity's next claim, based on the premise that the D'Oench
doctrine was preempted, was that the federal statutes' did not apply
because Motorcity repaid its loan prior to the FDIC's appointment as
receiver for Southeast Bank.'79 The argument was that both statutory
counterparts to the D'Oench doctrine apply only when a claim would
defeat the FDIC's interest in a specific asset and that would have
been avoided by the repayment of the loan."" The court failed to
comment on the specific asset requirement of the statutes due to its
application of the D'Oench doctrine.'
The court noted that the D'Oench doctrine is not limited to
claims arising from specific assets, rather, it covers all claims arising
from ordinary banking transactions." The court was concerned that
allowing a claimant to circumvent the D'Oench doctrine by repaying
a loan before filing suit would undermine the policies behind the doc-
173. See Murphy, 61 F.3d at 40.
174. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1329.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 330.
178. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(9)(A), 1823(e)(1) (1994)
179. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1334.
180. See Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that § 1823(e) ap-
plies only when the FDIC's interest in a specific asset would be impaired by the alleged
secret agreement); John v. RTC, 39 F.3d 773, 776-77 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Section 1823(e)
requires an identifiable 'asset' which is acquired by the bank and then transferred to the
regulatory agency, and to which the unenforceable agreement must relate."); Thigpen v.
Sparks, 983 F.2d 644, 648-49 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that both §§ 1821(d)(9)(A) and
1823(e) are limited to a specific asset requirement).
181. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1334.
182. See Brookside Assocs. v. Rifkin, 49 F.3d 490,495 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
D'Oench doctrine is not limited to a specific asset); RTC v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587,
594-95 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that, regardless of whether a specific asset is
involved, the D'Oench doctrine applies to claims or defenses that relate to ordinary
banking transactions), cerL denied sub non; Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78,
82 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting specific asset requirement for the D'Oench doctrine); Jackson
v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 730,734-35 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that claims that do not diminish or
defeat the FDIC's interest in a specific asset are still barred by the D'Oench doctrine).
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trine." The doctrine was designed "to protect the bank examiners
who rely on the bank's records in assessing the bank's condition, to
protect the FDIC's ability to insure deposits, and to place the burden
on borrowers to make sure that all of the terms of their loan agree-
ments are in writing."'' " Because the D'Oench doctrine was not
preempted and did not contain a specific asset requirement, Motor-
city's repayment of the loan did not validate its claims.'"
The court held that application of the D'Oench doctrine barred
all claims arising from oral agreements related to the written floor
plan financing agreement.'" Any terms not contained in the agree-
ment were not privy to the FDIC upon its examination of Southeast
Bank's records and, therefore, cannot be held against them.'Y Mo-
torcity, in an attempt to sidestep the contract issue, argued that its
claims for breach of a fiduciary duty and negligence fell within the
D'Oench doctrine's narrow exception for free standing torts" and
were unrelated to the floor plan financing agreement.'89 Again, the
court barred this cause of action by applying the D'Oench doctrine."9
The D'Oench doctrine acts as a bar to all claims, even those
sounding in tort, that are "sufficiently intertwined with regular
banking transactions, such that exclusion of the alleged 'secret
agreement' accords with the underlying policies of D'Oench.'.'. The
free standing tort exception applies only to claims unrelated to ordi-
nary banking transactions.9 2 Motorcity's claims related to assurances
made during the course of negotiating the floor plan financing
agreement, and they were, therefore, related to ordinary banking
transactions and should have been included in the terms of the writ-
ten agreement.' To hold otherwise would expose the FDIC to risks
that it could not possibly have foreseen after a thorough examination
of Southeast Bank's records'"
183. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1335.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 1336.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See In re Geri Zahn, 25 F.3d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994).
189. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1336.
190. See id.
191. Zahn, 25 F.3d at 1543; see also OPS Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 306,310
(11th Cir. 1993).
192. See Zahn, 25 F.3d at 1543-44.
193. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1338.
194. See id.
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Finally, after stripping away reliance upon any oral agreements,
the court addressed the validity of Motorcity's tort claims under state
law.195 To establish a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty, Motorcity
needed to show that Southeast Bank voluntarily assumed an obliga-
tion to act for the benefit of Motorcity.1 " Under Florida law, a
typical banking relationship does not give rise to a fiduciary duty by
the bank.197 To create a duty from this relationship, Motorcity
needed to show dependence and Southeast Bank must have assumed
the duty.198 Because Motorcity could not rely on the oral agreement
to notify, it could not use the oral agreement to prove Southeast
Bank assumed a duty.99
The court conducted a similar analysis for Motorcity's negli-
gence claim. Before a defendant can be held liable for negligence
under Florida law, that defendant must have a legal duty to protect
the plaintiff from harm.m A lender has no such duty"' unless volun-
tarily assumed.2' The audits conducted by Southeast Bank were for
its own purposesY3 Summary reports sent to Motorcity were merely
a courtesy.2 Therefore, the court determined that no tort duty had
been implied. 5 Finally, the court stated that the tort claim failed for
an entirely independent reason-the economic loss rule, which bars
pure economic recovery in a tort case unless it is distinguishable from
195. See id. at 1339.
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., Keyes Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 897 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D.
Fla. 1995); Metcalf v. Leedy, Wheeler & Co., 191 So. 690 (Fla. 1939); Vassar v. Smith, 183
So. 705 (Fla. 1938); Edwards v. Lewis, 124 So. 746 (Fla. 1929); Capital Bank v. MVB, Inc.,
644 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 659 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 1995);
Watkins v. NCNB Nat'l Bank, 622 So.2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
198. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1339 (relying on Cripe v. Atlantic First Nat'l Bank, 422
So.2d 820 (Fla. 1982); Willis v. Fowler, 136 So. 358 (Fla. 1931); Quinn v. Phipps, 113 So.
419 (Fla. 1927); Watkins, 622 So. 2d at 1065).
199. See id. at 1339-40.
200. See id. at 1341; Cooper Hotel Servs., Inc. v. MacFarland, 662 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 670 So.2d 939 (Fla. 1996); Paterson v. Deeb, 472
So.2d 1210, 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied sub nom., Langstom v. Pater-
son, 484 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1986).
201. See Chotka v. Fidelco Growth Investors, 383 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
202. See Saglio v. Chrysler First Commercial Corp., 839 F. Supp. 830, 834 (M.D. Fla.
1993); Capital Bank v. MVB, Inc., 644 So.2d 515, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review
denied, 659 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 1995).
203. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1342.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 1342-43.
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breach of contract.
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE
The central tenet of the D'Oench doctrine has been the protec-
tion of the FDIC in its handling of the assets of an insolvent financial
institution. The Supreme Court established the doctrine because it
recognized a federal policy "to protect [the FDIC], and the public
funds which it administers, against misrepresentations as to the secu-
rities or other assets in the portfolios of the banks which [the FDIC]
insures or to which it makes loans."27
This protection was recognized by Congress in the Federal De-
posit Insurance Act of 1950-the statutory codification of D'Oench.
The purpose behind the protection against secret banking agreements
was that the FDIC had to quickly evaluate the assets of an insolvent
bank in order to determine what course of action to take.m The Su-
preme Court explained:
[This] evaluation in particular, must be made 'with great
speed, usually overnight, in order to preserve the going con-
cern value of the failed bank and avoid an interruption in
banking services.' Neither the FDIC, nor state banking
authorities would be able to make reliable evaluations if
bank records contained seemingly unqualified notes that are
in fact subject to undisclosed conditions.'
Such protection has been given for two reasons. The first reason
was to induce banks to include all relevant terms and obligations in
the bank records. ° The second was to place the risk of secret agree-
ments on the parties that are in a better position to protect
themselves."' It is this blanket of protection for bank regulators that
is now in jeopardy due to recent holdings by the D.C. Circuit and the
Eighth Circuit.
The D.C. Circuit and the Eighth Circuit declared the D'Oench
doctrine preempted by statute based on the Supreme Court's holding
206. See AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 515 So.2d 180, 181
(Fla. 1987) (citing Lewis v. Guthartz, 428 So.2d 222, 224 (Fla. 1982)); see also, East River
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaveal, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986).
207. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,457 (1942)
208. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1324.
209. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1987) (quoting Gunter v. Hutchinson, 674
F.2d 862,865 (11th Cir. 1982)).
210. See Bauman v. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1515 (11th Cir. 1991).
211. See id.; see Bell & Murphy & Assocs. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, N.A., 894 F.2d
750,754 (5th Cir. 1990); In re NBW Commercial Paper Litigation, 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1461-
62 (D.D.C. 1992).
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in O'Melveny. Instead of following their lead, the Eleventh Circuit
decided the issue for itself. The Eleventh Circuit, in Motorcity, con-
ducted a full analysis of the relevant law and came to its own
conclusions regarding the O'Melveny decision. The Motorcity court
went back to the roots of D'Oench as a common law protection for
the FDIC.212 The history and interaction of the common law with its
statutory counterpart2 3 were explored. 4 The court noted that the
common law and the statute were typically used together. When the
statute fell short in its protection of the FDIC or other regulatory
agency, the common law was available to fill gaps left by the stat-
ute.
2 15
The issue of statutory preemption in relation to the presumption
of retention of long-established common law absent congressional
intent to the contrary was not discussed by the Murphy
26 or DiVall217
courts, nor by the Supreme Court in O'Melveny 8 Yet, this presump-
tion was at the heart of the Supreme Court's holding in United States
v. Texas.29 Because the Court did not address the presumption in
O'Melveny, it should have been clear that their holding did not ad-
dress the statutory preemption of long-established federal common
law. Without such an analysis, it seems imprudent, in light of the Su-
preme Court's reliance on the presumption in Texas, to interpret the
language of O'Melveny as holding that the D'Oench doctrine was
preempted by statute.
The Motorcity court conducted a careful and well reasoned
analysis of the preemption issue. ° Mindful of the presumption of the
retention of long-established common law as set forth by the Su-
preme Court in Texas, the court examined the legislative histories of
the 1950 and 1989 amendments. To preempt long-established com-
mon law, the intent of Congress must be evident."' The 1950 and
1989 amendments were enacted by Congress in light of the existence
of the D'Oench doctrine. The court found no evidence of Congres-
212. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1324-25.
213. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1994).
214. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1324-25.
215. See id. at 1325.
216. Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
217. DiVall Insured Income Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank, 69
F.3d 1398 (8th Cir. 1995).
218. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
219. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529,534 (1993).
220. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 83 F.3d 1317, 1327-34
(11th Cir. 1996).
221. See Texas, 507 U.S. at 534.
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sional intent to preempt the D'Oench doctrine in the legislative histo-
ries of both the 1950 and 1989 amendments.2m The court concluded
that the D'Oench was not inconsistent with the statute and the FIR-
REA amendments lacked the Congressional intent required to
preempt long-established common law.
The holding in Motorcity is not contrary to the Supreme Court's
holding in O'Melveny 4 In that instance, the FDIC did not call upon
the court to apply existing common law, but to create new common
law.22 It was the creation of new common law that the Court looked
upon with disfavor. In refusing to extend common law protection to
the FDIC in an area of no particular federal interest, the Court held
that the FIRREA was a comprehensive statutory scheme and an ex-
clusive grant of powers to the FDIC as receiver.Y The D'Oench
doctrine specifically addressed an area of particular federal interest,
and therefore, the Court would have to apply a different standard for
its preemption. But the Court did not address the presumption fa-
voring the retention of long-established federal common law absent
Congressional intent that it had relied upon just one year before in
Texas. The Court's holding in O'Melveny may establish some guide-
lines for when it is or is not appropriate to create new federal
common law in the area of federal regulatory protection, but it did
not follow its own test for preemption of long-established federal
common law as enunciated in Texas.
If the Murphy27 and DiVallP courts had examined the presump-
tion favoring retention of long-established common law absent
congressional intent to the contrary, which is the proper standard un-
der Texas, they might have interpreted the Court's holding in
O'Melveny"9 in line with the Eleventh Circuit. Under the Eleventh
Circuit's holding, if the intent of Congress was not to preempt
D'Oench, then the statutory scheme would be interpreted with the
common law included as an integral part, much like what was done
by courts prior to O'Melveny. The O'Melveny decision was not a
222. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1332 (citing FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 514 n.1
(5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the legislative history of the 1950 amendment does not men-
tion D'Oench and deciding that Congress did not intend to preempt)).
223. See id. at 1333.
224. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
225. See idu at 86-87.
226. See id
227. Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
228. DiVall Insured Income Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank, 69
F.3d 1398 (8th Cir. 1995).
229. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
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change in the Court's stance on the D'Oench doctrine, it was merely
a refusal to create additional common law protection for the FDIC
and to establish some guidelines for when it would do so.
The importance of the Motorcity decision has two separate as-
pects. The first is that it provides a well reasoned response to the
D.C. Circuit and the Eighth Circuit cases, both of which held for the
preemption of the D'Oench doctrine. The Eleventh Circuit used the
appropriate test for examining the preemption of long-established
federal common law, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Texas. It
can serve as a valuable model in cases involving secret banking
agreements and federal bank regulatory agencies. Until the preemp-
tion issue is fully addressed by the Supreme Court, the careful
analysis of the Eleventh Circuit provides the strongest argument for
the survival of the federal common law D'Oench doctrine.
The second reason that the Motorcity decision is important is
based on the government's policy of protecting regulatory agencies.
The reason for the protections extended in D'Oench and its statutory
counterparts are still prevalent today. The soundness of the financial
community is still of concern, as evidenced by Congressional action,
including the FIRREA. Regulatory agencies must still act quickly in
the event of insolvency, maybe even more so due to the increased
technology of today's world. Change in the banking industry and the
financial sector as a whole are occurring at a rapid pace. These
changes may easily outdistance current regulatory schemes. Con-
gressional response to immediate problems takes time. This time
could have great costs to the federal deposit insurance pool, which in
turn costs the public. Without the flexibility of a common law doc-
trine to fill in gaps left by the federal statutes, more parties will find
ways to circumvent the statutory protections, as with the specific as-
set requirement, and take advantage of information to the
detriment of government regulatory agencies, the banking system,
and ultimately the public.
V. ACTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to the petitioner
in Motorcity.21 The Court vacated the opinion of the Eleventh Cir-
230. This concern was raised by the court in Motorcity. If parties were allowed to
repay their loans prior to filing suit, they would defeat the specific asset requirement
every time and invalidate the statutory protections. Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1335.
231. Hess v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997).
[Vol. 1
THE D'OENCH DOCTRINE
cuit and remandede 2 the case for further consideration in light of its
decision in Atherton v. FDICB3 This section will review the Court's
decision in Atherton.'" It will then discuss the impact of Atherton on
Motorcity and the federal common law D'Oench doctrine.23
A. Atherton v. FDIC
In Atherton v. FDIC,' the Resolution Trust Company (RTC)
sued the former officers of a failed, federally chartered savings asso-
ciation for gross negligence, simple negligence, and breach of a
fiduciary duty.27 The RTC was later replaced by the FDIC as re-
ceiver. 8 The district court held that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) 1 9 controlled,
and it allowed only the action for gross negligence. 2 ' The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third Circuit) reversed, holding that
the statute was merely a minimum standard that could be supple-
mented by other applicable law."4 The Third Circuit went on to hold
that the statute could be supplemented both by federal common law
for federally chartered financial institutions and by state law for state
chartered financial institutions.2
In Atherton, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the Third
Circuit's assertion that the statute could be supplemented by federal
common law.243 The Third Circuit applied a governance standard for
federally chartered financial institutions that derived from an 1891
Supreme Court decision.2" The Supreme Court held that the federal
common law standard for corporate governance, as previously an-
nounced by the Court in Briggs v. Spaulding,2" did not survive the
232. See id.
233. See id. (citing Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997)).
234. See infra notes 236-55 and accompanying text.
235. See infra notes 256-73 and accompanying text.
236. 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997).
237. See id. at 667.
238. See id.
239. This statute, like the statutes involved in O'Melveny, Murphy, DiVall and Motor-
city was part of the FIRREA amendments.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 670.
244. See id. The Third Circuit relied on prior Supreme Court decisions establishing a
federal common law corporate governance standard for officers of federally chartered
financial institutions. See id. (citing Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); Martin v.
Webb, 110 U.S. 7 (1884); Bowerman v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 504 (1919)).
245. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
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Erie2  decision abolishing general federal common law. '7 Rather, the
Court held that the standard for corporate governance of a federally
chartered financial institution was established by the federal statute '
and other applicable law.249 The Court also noted that the federal
statute established gross negligence as a minimum standard for offi-
cers of a federally chartered financial institution.2 The Court found
that this minimum standard may be supplemented by state law when
state law establishes a higher standard."1
In rejecting the arguments raised by the FDIC, 2 the Court held
that this was not an area of particular federal interest. It described
the areas of particular federal interest as "narrow." 3 Finally, the
Court found that the federal statute' can supplant a state law stan-
dard of care that falls below the gross negligence standard. 2
B. Impact of Atherton on Motorcity
The Supreme Court remanded Motorcity to the Eleventh Circuit
for consideration consistent with its holding in Atherton. The Elev-
enth Circuit must now determine Atherton's impact on Motorcity.
Atherton may be distinguished from Motorcity on several important
grounds. The first distinguishing factor is the Supreme Court's reli-
246. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). "There is no federal general
common law." Id. at 78.
247. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 670.
248. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994); see also Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 667 ("A director or
officer of [a federally insured bank] may be held personally liable for monetary damages
in any [RTC-initiated] civil action ... for gross negligence [or] similar conduct ... that
demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care [than gross negligence.... Nothing in
this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the [RTC] under other applicable law."
(quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k)).
249. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 669.
250. See id.
251. Seeid.
252. The FDIC raised four arguments in support of the federal common law. First, the
FDIC argued a need for uniformity. See id. at 671. Next the FDIC argued that the fed-
eral common law standard should apply because the institution was federally chartered.
See id. Third, the FDIC referred to a conflict of laws principle known as the internal af-
fairs doctrine. See id. at 673. The doctrine seeks to avoid conflict by establishing a single
point of legal reference. See id. The FDIC analogized the current case, and federal
common law for federally chartered institutions, to one in which state law would govern a
state chartered corporation. See id. Finally, the FDIC points to the Office of Thrift Su-
pervision (OTS), an agency with certain statutory powers, which had spoken
authoritatively on the subject of officer standards, similar to those espoused in Briggs.
See id.
253. See id. at 674.
254. The federal statute in Atherton was 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k).
255. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 674-76.
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ance on Erie to overrule the federal common law standard of conduct
for officers of a federally chartered financial institution. 6 It is un-
likely that Erie would be used to overturn the D'Oench doctrine
because the D'Oench doctrine was established by the Supreme Court
in a decision that came after the Court's holding in Erie,' and this
area was recognized by the Court as an area appropriate for federal
common law.
Another distinction between Atherton and Motorcity is that in
Atherton, the RTC, replaced by the FDIC as receiver, brought the
claim against the former officers.28 In Motorcity, the FDIC is de-
fending on a claim by a customer of an insolvent financial
institution.2" In Motorcity, the FDIC is in a defensive posture, and in
the course of assuming that posture, it had to rely on the written rec-
ords of the bank. In Atherton, the FDIC is in an offensive role,
seeking litigation. In that posture, the need for protection is not as
great because the litigation was thrust upon them.
The major distinction is the recognition of a federally protected
interest. In Atherton, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a fed-
erally protected interest that required the protection of the federal
common law.2" The Court felt that it was proper to allow the federal
statute'61 and applicable state law to control. 2 This was not the case
in D'Oench, where the Court specifically recognized a federal policy
to protect the FDIC.' It would be difficult to argue that protection
of the FDIC is not a uniquely federal interest. The FDIC acts to in-
sure all of the country's financial institutions, both state and federally
chartered. It is the only such agency that currently performs this
function. By its very nature it is unique and operates to protect all
depositors. It is inherently a federal institution that requires the pro-
tection of the federal common law in the area of secret banking
agreements.
While it is readily apparent that Motorcity is distinguishable
from Atherton, this may not be enough to prevent the demise of the
federal common law D'Oench doctrine. The Supreme Court's deci-
256. See id. at 670.
257. The Erie decision was issued by the Court in 1938, and the D'Oench decision was
issued by the Court in 1942.
258. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 669.
259. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1322.
260. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 673.
261. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994).
262. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. 669.
263. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. at 457 (1942).
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sion in Atherton signals a trend by the Court that begins with the
O'Melveny decision. In both of these cases, the Court rejects the use
of federal common law in an area that is at least partially occupied by
the FIRREA and allows only state common law to supplement the
federal statute.
Presumably, it was this trend that the Supreme Court had in
mind when it remanded the Motorcity case to the Eleventh Circuit
with the instructions regarding Atherton.24 If on remand the FDIC
were forced to rely only on the defenses provided in the FIRREA
supplemented by the applicable state law, it would likely be unable to
successfully defend against the claims of Motorcity. The Eleventh
Circuit analyzed Motorcity's claims for negligence and breach of a
fiduciary duty under state law and determined that they would not
prevail.265 The state law claims also failed under Florida's economic
loss rule.' 6 However, Motorcity would most likely prevail under the
federal statute,27 which required the claim to defeat the FDIC's in-
terest in a specific asset.m Motorcity's repayment of its loan prior to
trial would circumvent the FDIC's statutory protection.269 Motorcity
would also be free to recast its contract claims as tort claims absent
the federal common law D'Oench doctrine bar to such claims.'7
This potential outcome shows the FDIC's need for the protec-
tion of the federal common law provided by the D'Oench doctrine.
The case for the federal common law protection is much stronger
here than it was in O'Melveny or Atherton. 1 It is difficult to con-
ceive that the Supreme Court intends to eliminate the D'Oench
doctrine when (1) the D'Oench doctrine does not have the weak-
nesses of the federal common law doctrines rejected in Atherton and
O'Melveny;2 (2) without the D'Oench doctrine, the statutory protec-
tion can be easily circumvented;'m and (3) the Supreme Court has not
squarely addressed the presumption of the retention of long-
264. See Hess v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997).
265. See supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
267. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) (1994).
268. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
271. In D'Oench, the Supreme Court found a federally protected interest, which was
not present in O'Melveny or Atherton. O'Melveny involved the creation of new federal
common law and Atherton involved federal common law developed prior to the Erie deci-
sion. Neither of these shortcomings were found in D'Oench.
272. See supra note 271.
273. See supra notes 178-94 and accompanying text.
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established federal common law absent Congressional intent to the
contrary, as raised by the Court in Texas and relied on by the Elev-
enth Circuit in Motorcity.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal common law D'Oench doctrine was established by
the Supreme Court in recognition of the FDIC's need for federal pro-
tection from secret banking agreements. 4 Congress also recognized
the FDIC's need for federal protection and codified the D'Oench
doctrine in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950. The codifica-
tion of the common law was not meant to preempt the developing
D'Oench doctrine.2 For many years the D'Oench doctrine and the
federal statute have worked together to provide protection against
secret banking agreements to federal regulatory agencies.276
Congress acted in this area again with the passage of the Finan-
cial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,
which included a codification of the then existing federal common
law D'Oench doctrine27n As with the 1950 codification, there was no
evidence that Congress intended to preempt the existing federal
common law.27 The Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the FIRREA in O'Melveny, lead-
ing them to hold that the federal common law D'Oench doctrine was
preempted by the FIRREA.279 The Eleventh Circuit distinguished
O'Melveny and addressed the issue of statutory preemption of long-
established federal common law, under the test utilized by the Su-
preme Court in Texas, and held that Congressional intent to preempt
the D'Oench doctrine was absent; therefore, the federal common law
doctrine was still viable.'
Recent action by the Supreme Court casts some doubt on the
strength of the analysis by the Eleventh Circuit in Motorcity. The
Court instructed the Eleventh Circuit to vacate their opinion and
274. See D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 457.
275. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1332 (citing FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 514 n.1
(5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the legislative history of the 1950 amendment does not men-
tion D'Oench and deciding that Congress did not intend to preempt)).
276. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
277. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821 (d)(9)(A) and 1823(e).
278. See Motorcity, 83 F.3d at 1333.
279. See Murphy, 61 F.3d at 40; DiVall, 69 F.3d at 1402.
280. For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuits analysis, see supra notes 163-77 and
accompanying text.
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consider the case in light of the Court's decision in Atherton.21 Ath-
erton is distinguishable from Motorcity in several important areas.'
However, the Supreme Court seems intent on establishing a practice
of eliminating federal common law protection for the FDIC in favor
of the FIRREA protection augmented only by applicable state law.
Therefore, while the Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the preemp-
tion issue in Motorcity is thoughtful and well reasoned, it may prove
to be an exercise in futility. It is quite possible that the Supreme
Court is going to lay the D'Oench doctrine to rest without squarely
addressing the issue of statutory preemption as brought forward by
the Eleventh Circuit in Motorcity. This tactic by the Court, if success-
ful, will likely draw much criticism for its lack of careful analysis and
not fully addressing all relevant concerns.
ROBERT B. MARKWORTH
281. Hess, 117 S. Ct. at 760.
282. See supra notes 256-63 and accompanying text.
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